


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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE

Intelligence Memorandum

North Vietnam's Ability to Withstand Manpower Attrition

MORI/CDF Pages 1-31, 33, & 37

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
June 1968

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INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

North Vietnam's Ability to Withstand
Manpower Attrition

Summary

This memorandum analyzes North Vietnam's ability to withstand manpower attrition at the very high levels sustained during the first five months of 1968.

Manpower losses are placing a heavy burden on North Vietnam but have not exhausted its manpower reserves. Even if losses are sustained at their present high levels, North Vietnam can maintain the combat forces in South Vietnam at their current strength well beyond 1969. It could, at least through 1968, probably also significantly increase Main Force strength levels by increasing infiltration or deploying additional new units. The sharp acceleration of manpower inputs into the South and the need to sustain them over extended periods of time will, however, produce increasingly severe strains on North Vietnam. Both military and civilian morale may decline, and the combat effectiveness of the Northern troops sent South will suffer. In addition, North Vietnam will have to sacrifice even greater elements of its most prized human resources.

The present and prospective manpower drains may have influenced Hanoi's shift to the current fight-talk strategy in an effort to achieve a decisive outcome in a relatively short period of time. In the final analysis, however, North Vietnam's willingness to bear this manpower burden will be

Note: This memorandum was produced solely by CIA. It was prepared jointly by the Office of Economic Research and the Office of Current Intelligence and was coordinated with the Office of National Estimates and the Director's Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs.

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determined by the extent to which Hanoi feels that its effort is moving the war toward a satisfactory solution. Hanoi's strategy in short will be dictated more by political judgments than by simple questions of physical capability.

Enemy losses in North Vietnam, Laos, and South Vietnam have reached record levels during 1968 and are running in excess of 32,000 a month. More than 90 percent of these losses take place in South Vietnam. Because the Viet Cong have only a limited recruitment capability -- an estimated 7,000 to 10,000 a month -- most manpower replacements must come from the North.

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The limits of estimated Viet Cong recruitment capabilities would indicate that North Vietnam might have to provide as many as 260,000 to 300,000 men a year to replace all losses -- in the North, in Laos, and in the South. This requirement seems excessive because the losses in the South may be overstated or include personnel in low-order irregular units. Nevertheless, it is estimated that infiltration to the South will be adequate to replace losses among regular combat units and to provide for some expansion of the force structure.

A possible requirement to furnish as many as 240,000 men to the South and to make up losses in the North and in Laos will force North Vietnam to dig deeply into its manpower reserves. The estimated requirements far exceed the annual draft input of about 120,000 males. To furnish the remainder North Vietnam has several options. It can draw down its in-country military establishment, but, unless it is willing to go into the strategic reserve, this option would provide only about 50,000 troops. It could also widen draft age limits for military service. A large part of this manpower -- from about 25 to 30 percent -- must come from the civilian labor force which contains an estimated

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mobilization pool of 500,000 physically fit males. It is estimated that this drain will not be excessive as long as North Vietnam can continue to import increasing amounts of foodstuffs and consumer goods from its Communist allies.

The interplay of infiltration, recruitment, and losses has brought about sharp fluctuations in the strength of enemy forces since 1 January. However, the net change from 1 January to 30 April has been an increase of only about 10,000 troops. An analysis of current infiltration patterns and loss rates does not enable firm judgments on the extent to which the force structure will be further increased, either nationally or in specific regions. It is apparent, however, that further expansion is under way. Whatever the rate of infiltration, it will, at a minimum, be adequate to give the Communists a continuing ability to maintain pressures against Allied forces and urban areas such as Saigon.

I. Assumptions

This analysis of North Vietnam's capability to withstand manpower attrition is based on the following assumptions:

1. The level of combat during 1968 and 1969 will result in enemy manpower losses at the extremely high rate sustained during the first five months of 1968.

2. Manpower requirements must be met completely from resources within North Vietnam and South Vietnam, with no manpower inputs from third countries.

3. The present bombing of North Vietnam will continue, and, because of uncertainty about future bombing programs, the North Vietnamese will not feel free to disband the civilian labor forces or air defense forces organized against the bombing program.

4. The North Vietnamese will attempt to furnish manpower without reducing their strategic reserve, estimated to be about 300,000 troops.

II. Present Manpower Distribution

A. North Vietnam

1. Military Forces

The North Vietnamese are estimated to have about 500,000 men in the Regular Armed Forces and another 400,000 in the militia/security forces as of 1 April 1968. About 35,000 of these troops are deployed in Laos; an estimated 115,000 to 130,000 regular troops and support personnel are deployed in South Vietnam.*

* These are independent CIA estimates of the strength of North Vietnamese forces in South Vietnam. As estimates they tend to be higher than the strength levels derived by conventional Order of Battle techniques.

The North Vietnamese forces in South Vietnam are a significant element of the total enemy combat strength in South Vietnam. They account for about 70 percent of the organized strength of Main and Local Force units.

2. Civilian Labor Force

North Vietnam has an estimated 10.4 million people in the 15-to-64 age group. Excluding the 500,000 in the armed forces and the approximately 120,000 students 15 years of age and above, the civilian labor forces comprises about 9.8 million. The number of civilian workers that have been required to offset the effects of airstrikes on North Vietnam is estimated to be about 600,000, including full-time and part-time workers, both male and female of all ages. Nearly a third of these workers are occupied full-time in the reconstruction and maintenance of lines of communication and in the movement of supplies. The part-time civilian force required for war-related tasks is used primarily as conditions warrant in civil defense activities, bomb damage repair, and movement of supplies.

B. South Vietnam

The Viet Cong have established an organized insurgency base that numbers roughly 500,000 people, including the NVA troops in South Vietnam. This insurgency base includes organized military and irregular units as well as the political infrastructure. Less than half of the people are full-time personnel in the organized military and irregular units that constitute a true military threat. The remainder includes large numbers of older people and youths as well as women, most of them organized on a part-time basis. Although they are vital to the functioning of the VC infrastructure and are important for support of military forces, they do not constitute offensive military threats.

III. Manpower Availabilities

A. North Vietnam

1. Annual Additions

Of North Vietnam's population of 18.7 million at the beginning of 1968, approximately

2.8 million are males within the draft ages of 17 and 35. About 1.5 million of these draft-age males are believed to be physically fit, and about 500,000 are already in the armed forces, leaving a potential military manpower pool in the civilian labor force of more than one million physically fit draft age men. During 1968, slightly less than 200,000 will reach the military service age and an estimated 120,000 of these probably would be fit for military service. Although total forces have increased only slightly since the beginning of 1967, induction at an annual level of 100,000 to 120,000 was almost certainly continued during 1967 to replace normal attrition and the greatly increased Communist losses in South Vietnam. If Communist losses continue at the level of the first five months of this year and if the North Vietnamese replace these losses, the estimated 120,000 physically fit men reaching draft age this year will fall far short of meeting these demands. Three alternatives are available to make up this deficit: (a) further reducing in-country forces; (b) tapping the physically fit civilian manpower pool; or (c) widening the draft age limits for military service.

2. In-Country Forces

The current Joint Staff/DIA estimate is that North Vietnam probably considers about 300,000 of the present in-country forces necessary to provide for defense of the homeland. This basic defense force includes six infantry divisions, air and coastal defense forces, and command and logistics elements. A force of about 50,000 would be available for out-of-country deployment during the last half of 1968. This diversion of 50,000 military personnel would be a one-time nonrecurring input to the Communist force level in South Vietnam until such time as the original units were regenerated in the North.

3. Civilian Labor Force

North Vietnam has a civilian manpower pool of nearly one million physically fit draft-age males. An estimated 500,000 of these could be mobilized from the civilian labor force for military service without grave disruption to the economy.*

* In addition, many of the 120,000 students above the age of 15 could be put to work to replace draft-age laborers not now in military service.

As with the drawdown of in-country military forces, the drains from the labor force would be a one-time nonrecurring gain for the armed forces and when exhausted could not be regenerated.

Labor could be drawn from several sectors of the economy. The North Vietnamese labor force is largely unskilled, underemployed, and, at least in agriculture, seasonally unemployed. Agriculture (including animal husbandry, fishing, and forestry) employs about 7 million people, or almost 70 percent of the civilian labor force, and is particularly labor-intensive. It is estimated that at least 200,000 workers could be drawn from agriculture without a decline in agricultural output because of the low average productivity of North Vietnamese farmers. Moreover, additional labor can be withdrawn from agriculture by substituting imported food for lost domestic production. Of the approximately 800,000 in the industrial labor force, about 600,000 are engaged in handicraft activities. Probably about one-fourth of these could be diverted to the armed forces without a significant loss in essential output. Consumer goods would be scarcer, but increased imports could be at least a partial offset. It is estimated that 10 percent of the 1.1 million workers in the trade and services sector of the economy could be diverted to the military establishment with only a slight effect on the economy. Much of the labor in the trade and services sector is engaged in marginal occupations such as personal services, sanitation work, and the like. These workers can be easily replaced by less trained people, without serious economic disruption.

B. South Vietnam

Since the beginning of the year the Communists have substantially increased the South Vietnamese population under their control and, consequently, the manpower available for recruitment. Although the Communists claim that by the end of March 1.6 million people had been "liberated," US population control data indicate that the figure probably is closer to 1 million. At the end of 1967, the Hamlet Evaluation System (HES) recorded 2.8 million people under VC control. At the end of March 1968, the HES data recorded more

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than 3.1 million under VC control. An additional 720,000 were added to the contested category. The VC are able to draw on this base plus other population groups not directly under their control.

IV. Manpower Losses

Losses sustained by Viet Cong/North Vietnamese enemy forces have been running at unprecedented rates during 1968. On a monthly basis, total manpower losses have exceeded 32,000 a month, more than 90 percent of these taking place in South Vietnam.

A. South Vietnam

According to MACV estimates, Viet Cong/North Vietnamese forces have lost more than 145,000 men during the first five months of 1968. This estimate includes all causes -- killed, died of wounds, disabled, died of sickness and accident, deserted, defected, and captured. We believe this estimate is high enough to include those lost from airstrikes, losses during infiltration, and would note that it probably includes large numbers from the insurgency base outside the Regular Forces. The average monthly rate of 29,000 is in contrast to a monthly rate of about 13,000 during the last quarter of 1967.

B. North Vietnam and Laos

It is estimated that the forces within North Vietnam lose personnel, through such causes as disability, retirement, and losses resulting from air attack, at a maximum annual rate of about 10 percent. This amounts to about 35,000 a year, or a monthly rate of about 3,000 persons. North Vietnamese civilian and military losses resulting from air attacks have been negligible since 31 March because of the reduced level of bombing.

There is little information with which to estimate the attrition of enemy forces in Laos. For purposes of this estimate, it is assumed that the forces in Laos experience annual losses of about 15 percent, or about 5,000 troops.

V. Current Manpower Replacement

A. Viet Cong Recruiting

Primarily because of the large rural population now under Viet Cong control, the Communists in South Vietnam have apparently been able to come by sufficient manpower to replace most of the heavy 1968 losses in Viet Cong organizations. But the average quality of these forces has declined somewhat. We believe that present Viet Cong monthly recruiting is on the order of 7,000 to 10,000. The Viet Cong have resorted to an increasing degree of coercion in its recruitment program during the last few months. To the extent that the need for coercion may portend an inability to keep recruitment at the 7,000 to 10,000 level then the drain on North Vietnamese manpower could become even greater than estimated but still would not exceed North Vietnamese capabilities.

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VI. Manpower Replacement Capabilities

A. Quantitative Aspects

Total estimated enemy manpower losses during 1968 are heavily weighted by the MACV estimates of losses in South Vietnam, which account for more than 90 percent of the estimated average monthly loss of 32,000 persons, or more than 380,000 for the year. The MACV estimate of 29,000 losses a month includes in it a substantial number of laborers and other civilians as well as persons in lower order irregular elements such as Self-Defense Forces and Assault Youth. Thus they should probably be regarded as an overstatement of the manpower that must be provided to maintain the strength of the regular military forces.

It is impossible to differentiate between losses sustained by regular combat units and other categories of organized forces or civilians. The available evidence on current recruitment efforts as well as infiltration movements makes it apparent that the Communists are intent on and have the capability of maintaining the strength of regular combat forces and guerrillas at their pre-Tet levels.

Recruitment in South Vietnam is estimated to have averaged about 7,000 to 10,000 a month thus far in 1968. Unless Viet Cong control over its population base is significantly eroded, this rate can probably be maintained, giving the Viet Cong a total manpower input of from 80,000 to 120,000 for 1968.

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With this capability in the South and assuming that the remainder of the manpower burden must be assumed by North Vietnam, then Hanoi must provide from 260,000 to 300,000 personnel.

Quantitatively this burden is within North Vietnam's capabilities, as shown in the following tabulation for 1968 and 1969::

	<u>Thousand Persons</u>	
	<u>1968</u>	<u>1969</u>
Annual draft	120	120
Military redeployment	50	
Drawdown from civilian labor force	90 to 130	140 to 180
<i>Total</i>	<i>260 to 300</i>	<i>260 to 300</i>

These manpower requirements imply a draw-down of the civilian labor force of about 110,000 in 1968 and 160,000 in 1969. This is roughly 25 to 30 percent per year of the 500,000 laborers estimated to be available for mobilization. A large number of these would already have had some training, being members of reserve or militia units. Thus the quantitative limits of North Vietnamese manpower would not be exhausted by the end of 1969 and indeed could be continued for at least another year or two.

The provision of this much manpower implies that North Vietnam would replace all losses, regardless of the type of forces sustaining them. This is doubtful because, as noted above, many of the casualties are sustained by low-order irregular elements or civilians.

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It should be noted that about 40,000 of the estimated losses are sustained by forces in North

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
Vietnam and Laos. They do not enter into the infiltration estimate. When they are subtracted from total losses, the maximum call on North Vietnamese manpower to serve in the South is from 220,000 to 260,000. These figures are roughly consistent with the projections of infiltration for 1968. Since a flow of this magnitude would not be designed to replace all losses in South Vietnam, it must be regarded as an indicator of a decision to expand somewhat the NVA force structure in the South.

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


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B. Qualitative Aspects



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Prisoner and defector interrogation reports have always contained references to poor morale and low motivation. The reporting in 1968 interrogation reports has not differed enough from previous years to warrant a firm judgment of any significant or general decline in the quality of recent infiltrators. Although the reporting does indicate some further decline from that noted previously, it does not yet seem to reflect a serious problem particularly when other evidence is considered. To the extent that quality has deteriorated, it may partly reflect the limitations of the North Vietnamese training base.

The evidence is not sufficient to make a hard judgment of the extent of decline in the physical and training standards of 1968 infiltrators. There is increasing evidence, however, that regardless of quality there has been a decline in morale and fighting effectiveness. Training obviously has an important influence on morale as well as combat effectiveness. Some draftees have not completed a full cycle of basic or infiltration training, and reservists who make up the majority of several infiltrating groups have not received additional training after being called up. A more significant explanation of some decline in combat effectiveness is the fact

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that some battalion-size infiltration groups -- at least in the eastern DMZ and around Saigon -- recently have been put into battle as combat units with very little prior training with their assigned unit. The use of new personnel in this manner, particularly in unfamiliar areas, does enable the enemy to maintain pressure on friendly forces in an area of his choosing, but only at a very high cost in personnel losses. There is an increasing body of evidence indicating that the high number of casualties being taken by enemy forces and the fear of air attack contribute to a decline in troop morale and combat effectiveness.

These problems have not yet reached serious proportions, but they must be of some concern to Hanoi. Although the defection rate has been lower during 1968 than it was during 1967, there is a larger share of officers, including North Vietnamese, among 1968 defectors. Within the last month, there have been two instances of over 80 North Vietnamese soldiers surrendering en masse in I Corps. One recent document stated that infiltrated replacements "displayed poor combat spirit and abandoned their positions," adding that "nothing could stop them."

The North Vietnamese are now employing an estimated four divisions and two training groups for basic infiltration training. By employing a three-month training cycle, it is estimated that from 145,000 to 175,000 recruits can be trained each year. By shortening the training cycle or expanding the training base, an additional 50,000 to 60,000 recruits could be trained.

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Formal non-commissioned officer (NCO) and officer training schools, as well as the military academy at Son Tay, were abandoned after they were taken under attack by bombing. Officer training classes -- conducted at division level and lasting from two to three months -- are composed of senior NCO's or individuals who have

completed at least seven years of formal schooling. NCO training is no longer mandatory, but some divisions conduct short courses. Soldiers who have good records and exhibit political zeal are eligible to hold NCO rank. The largest single source of junior officers is now believed to be from battlefield promotions.

The North Vietnamese army is apparently experiencing a shortage of trained personnel to fill platoon leader, platoon sergeant, and squad leader positions, and the overall competence of the company-grade officer has declined. These factors are probably the result of increased demands of the air defense effort, the upgrading of several brigades to divisions, and the requirement to create additional divisions, regiments, and supporting elements for infiltration into South Vietnam. This quality problem will probably continue to plague the North Vietnamese army. It undoubtedly has caused some reduction in the effectiveness and regenerative capacity of some units.

The fact that the 1968 filler groups are comprised increasingly of men outside of the prime military age group -- many of them young, recent draftees and older reservists -- is consistent with Hanoi's desire not to weaken the quality of the home army. Hanoi, moreover, may be trying to avoid creating a large gap in particular age groups and to husband a share of the superior manpower in each age group. Some evidence of this is the fact that large numbers of prime candidates for lower level military leadership could be found among the student population which has expanded during the past three years, despite the increasing need for troops.

VII. Impact of Manpower Inputs on Enemy Capabilities

Since the heavy February attacks, most of North Vietnam's manpower inputs have come from filler infiltration to offset current losses or to build up units that were weakened during the Tet offensive. The combination of filler infiltration and in-country recruiting/upgrading has probably enabled the enemy to build up his Regular Forces by something on the order of 10,000 men during January-April 1968, despite heavy losses.

The deployment of Viet Cong/North Vietnamese Main and Local Forces did not change significantly during the first four months of 1968. The changes in relative troop dispositions, by Corps areas, seemed principally to raise force levels in the I and II Corps areas. In addition to the movement of at least two divisions into I Corps, the most significant redeployment of troops was the movement of the 325C North Vietnamese Division from the I Corps area into the northern highlands in the II Corps area during March and April. There were small decreases in the relative numbers of troops deployed in the III and IV Corps areas.

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VIII. The Price of Maintaining Force Levels

North Vietnam's manpower losses in support of the war in the South have been high, amounting to probably well over 200,000 men. It is possible that the present manpower drain and the prospects for its continuation have been an important influence on the North Vietnamese in their shift of policy on the war this year. Their decision to move to a "fight-talk" stage in the conflict -- seen in the current Paris talks -- appears to involve a desire to achieve a "decisive" outcome in the war in 1968 if possible, or in 1969 at the latest. Rather than face the drain of a continued long and piecemeal attritional war with the US, Hanoi may have opted for a near maximum effort in the hope that it could force a decisive outcome in a relatively short period of time. It may have viewed such an effort as potentially less costly -- if it could be brought off successfully -- than a continuation of its strategy of prior years.

Having opted for such a course the North Vietnamese will now be under strong pressure to make sure that their gamble pays off, and that the

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expenditure of manpower is not in vain. They may thus be more willing to accept some compromises, at least on the less significant elements of a settlement in the South, than they would have been had they attempted to continue along past policy lines. In the final analysis, however, Hanoi's willingness to continue to bear the burden of a stepped up input of manpower to the South will relate primarily to its judgment on extent to which the effort is moving the situation in South Vietnam toward a satisfactory solution.

As the North assumes an increasing role in the fighting, its share of the manpower drain is undoubtedly a matter of growing concern. Nevertheless, Hanoi shows no signs yet of backing away from its commitment and is apparently willing to increase its manpower investment if that is the price of achieving its political goals.

The gross levy on North Vietnam's manpower base will have reached highly significant levels if the inputs observed thus far in 1968 have to be maintained for extended periods of time. The manpower reserves are, however, adequate to absorb this level of attrition well beyond 1969. Hanoi, moreover, has other options that make the quantitative manpower drain more manageable. These would include a widening of draft age limits, additional drawdowns from the in-country military force, a reduction of the air defense and labor forces still kept intact to react to the bombings, and deeper cuts into the civilian labor force. The major effect of most of these measures would be an increase in North Vietnam's vulnerability to offensive military action, an increase in its dependence on its Communist allies for material aid, and additional personal sacrifice and deprivation.

Although a sustained and heavy input of manpower into the South is within North Vietnam's capabilities, there are additional considerations that make the effort a costly venture. These are primarily the long-term effects of substantial manpower losses and the probability of a worsening of morale among military forces and civilians.

Although morale in North Vietnam is adversely affected by results of the fighting in the South, the regime tightly controls the amount and kind of

information made available on the home front. The nature of the war, its direction, and the level of casualties suffered by North Vietnamese is probably not fully understood by most North Vietnamese. This knowledge will, however, be more difficult to conceal as the manpower commitment is sustained and casualties continue to mount. As draft calls continue, the effect on the morale of draft age males within North Vietnam probably is debilitating. By appealing to patriotism and by expounding the theme that victory is within sight, the regime is probably able to minimize the degree of resistance and resentment. The main contact that the average North Vietnamese civilian has with the war is the US bombing in the North, which has caused the separation of families, the loss of possessions, mental anguish, and physical pain. With the cessation of the bombing north of the 19th parallel, the morale of much of the population has undoubtedly improved. To convince the populace of the continuing need for the draft and other sacrifices, the regime is striving to remind the people that the US bombing program continues in part of North Vietnam and could be expanded at any time. There has, for example, been little relaxation of population controls of civil defense programs, and the air defense reaction to reconnaissance flights is vigorous and complete.

Although there are indications that the average quality of North Vietnamese troops has probably declined somewhat, military effectiveness has not yet been seriously affected. Some instances of significant desertion rates amongst North Vietnamese troops in recent weeks, particularly in the Khe Sanh area, have been noted, and there are reports from high-level defectors and prisoners that depict low morale.

The increasing evidence of declining morale among military forces and the likelihood that this will become more pervasive among civilians cannot be overlooked by Hanoi. These problems, however, are not governing for the regime. In a society as rigidly controlled as is that in North Vietnam, it is unlikely that popular disaffection will grow to the point at which it begins to exert a controlling influence on Hanoi's war policies.

The final determinant of Hanoi's willingness to sacrifice manpower will be its judgment of the likely course of events in the South. If the regime is convinced that its persistence can lead (1) to a toppling of the South Vietnamese leadership and the ascendancy of the National Liberation Front or the Alliance, (2) to a weakening of US determination to stay in the war, or (3) to a movement of the Paris talks along paths favorable to Hanoi's interest, the price will seem worthwhile.

APPENDIX

Notes on Methodology and the Data BaseA. Estimates of NVA Forces in South Vietnam

The estimates of NVA forces in South Vietnam are independent CIA assessments of Communist force levels. As estimates they are higher than MACV OB figures because the CIA figures are not subject to the restraints inherent in the acceptance criteria used in the conventional OB maintenance. The upward adjustments are of several types:

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(2) the use of estimative techniques to add unlisted support personnel integral to divisions, and (3) estimates made to reflect the enemy's measures through the infiltration process to bring units back to normal strength after losses have been sustained.

The major benefit of using estimative techniques to estimate enemy strengths is that they tend to eliminate most of the time lag in the acceptance of units into "order of battle" holdings. These estimates are believed to provide reliable approximations of enemy strength for the purpose of national intelligence and policy decisions. They are not intended and could not be used as OB holdings for field command and tactical purposes.

B. North Vietnamese Labor Force Data

According to US Bureau of the Census estimates, there are presently about 10.4 million North Vietnamese in the 15-to-64 age group. By excluding from this total the 500,000 in the armed forces and the approximately 120,000 students of working age, an estimated labor force of 9.8 million is derived. Such a figure represents a rate of growth of the labor force of 2 percent per year above the officially reported 1960 labor force figure of 8.1 million. This growth rate of 2 percent appears reasonable in view of the population growth rate during the period.

The US Bureau of the Census also estimates about 200,000 North Vietnamese males will reach the age of 17 in 1968 and about 205,000 will reach the age of 17 in 1969. Of these totals, at least 120,000 17-year-old males will be physically fit for military service in each of the years 1968 and 1969 -- according to DIA estimates.

The number of males regarded as physically fit may actually be higher. A recently captured North Vietnamese soldier reported that in 1965 only people with acute tuberculosis and heart disease were excused from the draft for physical reasons.

The following tabulation shows an estimate of the labor force, according to sectors of employment, as of 1 January 1968:

<u>Sector of Employment</u>	<u>Thousand Persons</u>
Agriculture	7,000
Services	800
Industry (including handicrafts)	800
Transport and communications	400
Trade	300
Construction	250
Other	250
<i>Total</i>	<i>9,800</i>

These figures were derived from the official data on the 1960 labor force and from various statements and figures announced by the regime during the last eight years.

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D. Enemy Losses

Total enemy losses of about 150,000 men during the first five months of 1968 are assigned as follows:

Killed in action (KIA)	100,055
Died of Wounds/ Permanently Disabled (DOW/PD)	32,200
Defections	2,633
Prisoners of war	2,307
Other losses	10,000
<i>Total</i>	<i>147,195</i>

The KIA data are subject to both upward and downward biases. There is, however, no assurance that they cancel each other out. In some situations, an actual count of bodies can be made, but in others, confusing and hectic combat conditions preclude such an estimate. The inclusion of civilians, laborers, and self-defense militia elements in KIA data all tend to overstate the actual number of enemy killed. During February 1968, MACV reduced the total monthly KIA figure by 10,000 to account for what they believed to be

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unusually large inclusions of these elements as a result of the Tet offensive. On the other hand, failure to include enemy forces killed by unobserved airstrikes and artillery barrages as well as the enemy's practice of removing dead from the battlefield tend to result in an understatement.

The DOW/PD estimate is calculated by multiplying KIA data by a factor of 0.35 which was derived from a 70-document study done by MACV in late 1966. For the February 1968 data, MACV used a factor of 0.18 on a portion of reported KIA's to allow for a lower DOW/PD to KIA ratio as a result of the urban fighting during the Tet offensive. This resulted in a factor of 0.28 on a countrywide basis for computing a DOW/PD estimate.

Although there have been difficulties in determining the number of detainees permanently detained, prisoner of war and Hoi Chanh data are probably the most reliable elements of the total losses estimate.

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"Other losses" include desertions, permanent losses as a result of sickness and accidents, discharges, and retirements. MACV has carried this total at 2,000 per month since 1967. Although little is known about these types of losses, evidence exists that they may be substantially greater than 2,000 per month. Desertion is believed to be far more common than defection (Chieu Hoi).

Substantial permanent losses also occur because of malaria and diet deficiencies. Furthermore, some military personnel have been active since the Viet Minh days and are becoming too old for strenuous combat duty.

E. Viet Cong Recruiting

The recruiting estimate of 7,000 to 10,000 per month for the last few months is reasonable and perhaps even conservative. The estimate is based on information on recruiting and upgrading activity and on our estimate of the overall strength and losses among the various Viet Cong elements.

Replacements for losses in the Main and Local Forces and Administrative Service troops come from direct recruiting and from upgrading from the Guerrillas. We believe upgrading is a larger source of manpower for the Regular Forces than is direct recruitment. The Viet Cong consider a "volunteer" from a Guerrilla unit as a recruit. In addition to these personnel moving into the Regular Forces, the Viet Cong recruit large numbers for the Guerrillas and other elements of the infrastructure. Many of these are of lower quality. At present, quotas for Guerrillas call for 40 to 60 percent females and 10 to 15 percent teenagers under sixteen years of age. We believe that the average quality of recruits for the regulars has not fallen seriously, because the better motivated and more experienced persons are taken. The average quality of Guerrillas continues to fall, as it has throughout the war. Although the quality of the Guerrilla soldier has decreased, the effectiveness of Guerrilla units has not decreased commensurately, because of the increased quality and quantity of Guerrilla weaponry.

On the basis of an assumed undiminished Viet Cong control over large elements of South Vietnam's population, we believe this rate can be maintained. On the basis of the same indications that we have used, MACV has recently revised its estimate of 1968 recruiting upwards. During the summer and fall of 1967, MACV believed that the recruiting rate had fallen off to about 3,500. After considering the apparent ability of the Viet Cong to replace losses during 1968, MACV has used estimates of between 7,000 and 12,000 in its retroactive adjustments of the order of battle.

F. North Vietnamese Defensive Requirements

The estimates of North Vietnamese home defense requirements are a joint estimate of the Joint Staff and DIA. Their justification of this estimate is given below.

It is recognized that the North Vietnamese army has a significant capability to reinforce in South Vietnam with regular forces, should the political decision to do so be taken. The dispatch of most of its division-size forces would, for

example, lead to a greatly stepped up enemy war effort along more conventional lines, with its resultant increased casualties, logistic requirements, and the like. If the North Vietnamese were to make such a decision, they would leave themselves open to the threat of an invasion. While they might hope that their regional forces and militia would be able to bear the initial brunt of such an invasion, they would be unable to contain an invasion and would probably have to recall sizable forces from South Vietnam or invite the Chinese to defend them.

In addition, they would be stripping the North of a major portion of the army's training base. The deployment of such sizable forces would create logistical requirements beyond the capability to sustain them in conventional combat, unless the bombing campaign were stopped.

For the purposes of this memorandum, therefore, we are assuming that a prudent North Vietnamese government faced with a threat of a US invasion would want to maintain at least six divisions and other forces in a position to counter any invasion, about 300,000 men. These forces would be needed to cope with the threat of an Inchon-type landing or an armored thrust north of the DMZ and to provide a North Vietnamese training base.

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
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

*NORTH VIETNAM'S ABILITY to
Withstand Manpower Attrition*



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Personal copies of this report have been sent to Mr. Rostow, General Wheeler and General Carroll. The DCI has directed that no further dissemination of this report be made without his specific approval.

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